1/Royal Marines at Miraumont
17 February 1917
Introduction:
As I sit here writing this article or a cold November evening, I can’t help but
turn my mind back eighty-three years to the RND's trial at Beaucourt. The
Battle of the Somme officially finished six days later that success and history
draws a line under the affair. History mainly picks the story up at Ypres bypassing
a whole section of many Divisions histories. In this respect the RND is no
different, people who knew me, know that I have often promoted Gavrelle as one
of these lost battles which often gets ignored, then there is one other which
is equally ignored and was virtually as costly-Miraumont. Although the Battle
of the somme drew to a close officallv at the end of November 1916, the
slaughter continued in the New Year as the higher command demanded that the
line he advanced In the Battles around Miraumont, the newly rested and
replenished RND suffered severely to take more mud. Ironically the Germans ceded
much land a few weeks later without a fight
in their March withdrawal, which raises the issue of whether the costly battles
on the Ancre were really needed at all.
The RND moved into the line around Grandcourt at the end January 1917 with preparation
for offensive action towards Miraumont. An attack was planned for February and
was to be conducted by units of 189 Brigade, with mainly Hood and Hawke
assaulting and Nelson in close reserve. The attack went ahead in the evening of
3 February and into the early hours of the 4th. The Brigade
succeeded in capturing River trench and settled on its gains but suffered
casualties of 24 Officers and 647 other ranks. figures which were significant,
especially in the light of the losses three months prior to this.
On 7th February it was the turn of l90 Brigade to attack. This went well with
1/HAC taking Baillescourt Farm which was in the river valley 600yds ahead of the
line taken and established on the 4th. The position now was that the
line was advanced into the river valley, but the high ground to the north and
south was still in German hands. It was this high ground that was to be the
subject of attacks of 3 Divisions on the 17th
Plan and Battle:
The plan was to take the sunken lane opposite Baillescourt farm. The lower
part of this lane approximately 100yards was in British hands. What was needed was to take the rest of this lane
and link with troops to the north. Once this lane had been taken strongpoints
were to be formed 50 yards in front of the sunken lane. On the southern flank,
the 18 Division was attacking northwards, at 90 degrees to the RND. On their
right flank. 2nd division was also attacking Boom ravine northwards towards
Pys and Petite Miraumont. The purpose of all of these attacks was to take
this high ground and remove a bulge in the British line west of Courcelette/
Pozieres.
188 Brigade was allotted the task of taking this line. Howe battalion was
to attack the sunken lane just north of Baillescourt Farm. On their left 1/RM
was to attack the rest of the sunken lane, 2/RM were to provide consolidation
parties and form a flank guard on the left flank Anson were holding the Baillescourt
farm and lower sunken Lane sector. 1/RM moved into the line on the night of
14/15th February, Howe moved into the line on the night of the 16thFeb, in
fact only just making it to the assembly area before the attack commenced.
Conditions generally were bad. The ground bad been frozen, but now was thawing
out, leaving the battlefield muddy. There were no trenches as such, they had
been blown away, at best there was a line of shell holes. The result was that
there were no landmarks, making it difficult to orientate units- It must be
remembered that there was only map and compass to find your way around, not
the modern Magellan system aided by satellites. Carrying parties and people
attempting to get to the front line were becoming disorientated and frequently
lost.
ABOVE:- THE PLAN OF ATTACK
Zero hour was 5.45 am, the attack commenced with a terrific artillery support.
The Germans retaliated with artillery, but it was not strong, especially to
the North. Despite these conditions there appeared to be the usual confusion
of HQ not receiving any news and this lead to confusion over where the artillery
should be directing its fire. It was decided to keep to the fire plan until
something was heard from Howe or 1/RM. The RND's artillery was being asked
to assist on the 18th Divisions front where big problems were occurring. Solid
information was received by 7.15. Howe had taken their portion of the Sunken
lane, l/RM had also taken their part and had pushed out 20yds beyond to form
strongpoints. 2/RM had secured the left flank. During l/RM's attack, their
two northernmost companies had veered right due to the lack landmarks. This
turned out to he providential as the wire in front of their intended target
was found to be uncut, but the part of the sunken lane they attacked by accident
had no wire at all. It was during this attack that Captain Pearson, OC of
A company 1/RM noticed some Germans trying to bring a machine gun into action
to the north. This would have meant that the Germans would have been able
to fire the gun straight down the sunken lane, in which the best part of two
battalions were occupying. Carnage would have resulted- Pearson personally
shot two of the Germans, and was joined by Lt Sanderson who between them shot
five more. The Germans gave up at this point. It's small acts like this that
can turn a battle. If this gun had been bought into action, the road would
have been lost along with many men. Pearson was awarded the MC for this work.
By 7.30 it was confirmed that the whole objective had been taken. The Marines
and Howe dug in and consolidated, Anson sent out battle patrols and the artillery
switched to assist 18th Division who were now making some progress.
Confusion still reigned
though partly through lack of visibility and also lack of solid information. General
Prentice wasn't quite satisfied that l/RM had gone north enough and ordered
them to extend northwards. Also he was concerned that an enemy strongpoint in that
area hadn't been dealt with and ordered /RM to sort it out. Accordingly 1/RM
extended northwards and linked with 2/RM’s consolidation parties. The strongpoint
was assaulted with the capture of 1 machinegun and 40 prisoners. Patrols were
pushed out to dominate the area in front. By this time 1 RM had taken many
casualties as they had suffered quite badly before the attack when the enemy
shelled the assembly trenches. A company of Hood was dispatched to bolster
their numbers. Thus ended the Battle of Miraumont. 188th Brigade had taken the
last part of the Miraumont spur and was now strongly holding a line with a
brilliant view down the Ancre valley with excellent fields of fire.
The following day at 7.30am
the Germans put down a heavy bombardment on the sunken lane, This was not
followed up though with assault as the visibility was poor due to mist. At
10.30 the mist lifted revealing that a German counter attack of about two battalions
strength was only approximately 300 yards away. Fortunately at this moment the
line back to HQ was repaired and an SOS message was sent. Within two minutes a
perfect barrage fell on the Germans. The Germans turned and ran, their counter
attack had been crushed. That was the last attempt to retake the ground. The
Germans contented themselves by barraging the ground instead. 188th Brigade
units were relieved on the 19th February.
The Cost:
The starting strength of
1/RM was quoted as being around 500. At the end of the days fighting it was
said that only 100 were fit for duty and published casualty figures and
retrospective examination confirms this. In actual terms the losses of 1/RM were
7 officers and 71 men killed, the wounded being approximately 300. These
casualties were virtually all caused by the bombardment of l/RM whilst waiting
to attack and after taking the objective. Very few men were killed in the
assault itself
Howe also suffered few losses
with 2 officers and 20 men killed and
around 200 wounded. 2/RM lost 1 officer and 5 men killed.
Conclusion:
This attack was an
unqualified success on the RND front. The ground taken was valuable. If you go
there today, you will see the view is amazing, you can see for miles, certainly
view to kill for. At the start of this account I asked the question as to
whether it was worth it in view of the retreat a month later. In my opinion the
answer is yes for several reasons.
Firstly there was no
knowledge of the retreat, in fact when it was well under way it was a while
before it was believed, after all the Germans were in a prime defensive
position and had always made a fight of it, so offensive action to remove them
was worth while. Secondly, even if a withdrawal was known about, an offensive would
make life very difficult for a unit trying to disengage and retreat. The
withdrawal was probably underway, arid this attack probably made life very
difficult. The observation position gained as a result of this attack would have
certainly made the Germans very uneasy.
Interestingly
the events of this day are often remembered for the allegations of treachery,
which circulated afterwards. This mainly applies to the attack of 2nd and
18th Divisions, but as the RND was involved in the same attack, and were drawn
into the discussion. Just before the attacks of these units the assembly trenches
were badly shelled and many casualties resulted. Captured Germans stated that
they knew the attack was coming and had planned for it and that the information
came from a deserter. General Gough ordered an immediate enquiry, the results
of which are not known as records cannot be found. But there is a transcript
of the interrogation of senior RND officers in the RND war diary. They were
asked about men missing days before the attack, some names of men from other
units were mentioned as being missing but all of these are subsequently accounted
for. This treachery allegation certainly rattled a few cages and a culprit
was never found. My own theory is as follows. I think that there wasn’t any
treachery. It was obvious for all to see that an offensive was in the offing. The barrage that caught the assembling
troops I feel was a lucky hit, a similar thing happened on the Broodsiende
Ridge where the Australians and Germans both conspired to attack at the same
place at virtually the same time. Knowing that an offensive was in the offing,
most started at the first light so a speculative barrage at sunrise would
always be worth attempting. The report of a traitor I feel was a red herring.
Saying something like that is sure to wind up the opposition, it certainly
did that and resulted in a great deal of time and effort by senior officers
to investigate it, when they should have been doing something better. This
theory isn’t as far fetched as the conventional one of a man deliberately
going across to the enemy and giving away information that would kill many
of his mates, especially as all the units involved were sound ones.
The Miraumont Battlefield Today
As with the Ancre Battlefield,
The Miraumont battlefield is easy to visit and walk over. There are several
strong morphological features which have not changed which will allow you
to orientate yourself. For those of you with an interest in the RND, it would
be possible for you to walk the Ancre battlefield and then follow the line
of advance up the road from Beaucourt towards Miraumont. I would suggest investing
in two of the Blue series IGN maps, 2407 ouest and 2407 est, because as usual
the area of interest is spread over two maps!!!!. If you drive towards Miraumont
from Beaucourt you come across the new Baillescourt farm built on the site
of the old one. Opposite the farm is the sunken lane. We parked at bottom
of it, careful to leave a space for a tractor to pass. If you walk up the
lane you can really get a feel for things. Firstly the depth of the lane,
you could hide a battalion in there. Getting up onto the top of the lane,
the view is down the Ancre valley into Miraumont. Looking backwards you can
see why the Germans wanted that position as you can see back to Beaucourt
with Bois Hollande and the area of River trench clearly visible.
